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Current research on UHF RFID system security mainly focus on protecting communication
safety and information privacy between a pair of specific tags and its corresponding
interrogation reader. However, instead of stealing detailed private information of tags,
adversaries may just want to estimate the cardinality of tags, which is named counting
attack. Unfortunately, most existing protocols are vulnerable to counting attack. To defend
against this attack, in this paper we propose ACSP, a novel Anti-Counting Security Protocol.
ACSP employs session identifier and provides a corresponding authentication metric to
verify the commands sent by the reader. To handle counting attack, ACSP periodically
updates the session identifier, and securely identifies tags with encryption. We evaluate
the performance of ACSP through theoretical analysis and qualitative comparison. Results
show that ACSP can efficiently withstand counting attack as well as defending against
regular security threats as existing protocols.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Ultra high frequency Radio Frequency Identification (UHF RFID) is an advanced technology for non-tangent automatic
identification, which is widely used in retailing, logistics, etc. It provides advantages such as non-line-of-sight operation,
higher inventory rates, and rewritablememory [1]. A complete RFID system ismainly composed of tags, one ormore readers
and corresponding backend systems. Each UHF RFID tag, without battery applied, is assigned with a unique ID. And the RFID
reader collects tag’s information through wireless communication.
RFID tags are usually attached to entities (objects or persons), and the entities can be identified by accessing the tags.
Thus, adversaries can identify or trace their targets via illegally accessing the related tags. Toward this end, the adversaries
usually hinder normal communication and steal private information (e.g. tag ID) by eavesdropping, mimicking or cloning
one communication side, playing as man-in-the-middle, etc. Four typical security threats are summarized by Rieback in [2]:
(i) sniffing: adversaries obtain tag IDs by eavesdropping back-scatter messages from tags; (ii) tracking: adversaries track
target’s movement by observing the messages attached tag responds; (iii) spoofing: in applications like supermarket
burglary-resist system, thieves mimic legal RFID tags by writing proper data and ID information into a blank tag, and then
remove the original tag attached to stolen goods. Such cloned tag attack has already been implemented in [3]; (iv) replay
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Fig. 1. General security model.
attack: adversaries play asmen-in-the-middle in order to intercept and retransmit reader’s queries. By this means, an illegal
reader could camouflage itself as an authentic one to communicate with tags.
Generally, the computing capability of passive tags is rather low due to the no built-in battery design. As a result, regular
encryption techniques and security protocols are infeasible for RFID system, especially on the tag side. Although there are
some security method for USB memories [4] or mobile devices [5], they cannot be directly used for RFID system because
of the special communication protocol. Therefore, challenge-response model (Fig. 1) is introduced to solve this problem. In
this model, the reader first challenges the tag for identification. The tag then responds to the challenge and challenges the
reader for authentication. Finally, the reader responds to finish the procedure.
Based on the challenge-response model, Molnar proposed a security protocol used in library RFID system [6] named
PRF, private authentication protocol, which uses pseudo-random functions to encrypt communication messages. Henrici
advanced hash-based ID variation protocol which implements ID update operation in [7], and improved this protocol in [8].
The new protocol is the so called Hash Chain and it greatly simplifies the hash-based ID variation protocol. Moreover,
Kulseng [9] elaborated how to realize security protocol via utilizing physical properties of tag’s circuits. On the other side,
Molnar [10] and Dimitriou [11] discussed the method to improve the search efficiency when the reader attempts to find the
exact ID value of the communicating tag in system appliedwith security protocols. Theymainly used binary tree structure to
manage tag’s IDs. Lu [12] proposed SPA protocol which implements tag ID update in this type of protocol. In [13], Lu further
improved this protocol via utilizing spare tree structure to break the connection of IDs among each tag. These works mainly
focus on how to protect the privacy and security of individual communication, which means providing a security tunnel
between the reader and the tag.
Consider the following scenarios: in a warehouse, each piece of merchandise is attached with one tag which keeps a
unique ID for automatic identification. A corporate spy may sneak into the warehouse and rapidly get stock information
like the amount of goods, by using a handhold reader to count the number of tag. Counting Attack is defined as, attacker’s
behavior of counting the number of objects through estimating cardinality of attached tags.
Although the attacker probably could not understand identification messages and authentication messages secured by
security protocols, by observing communication messages between the readers and tags or mimic as an authentic reader
to probe tags, they still can conduct such attack. Such security concern also exists in vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET)
systems, such as [14], if they adopt RFID devices for IFF [15].
To achieve counting attack, adversaries could apply either the framed slotted ALOHA method or the tree-based method.
For the ALOHA method, the reader first broadcasts the initialization message to set the frame size (slot number), and then
each tag picks a slot to reply based on a specific probability distribution. The reader can repeat this procedure several times
and estimate the tag cardinality by analyzing reply information. For the tree-based method, the reader identifies each tag
like traversing a tree, in which root node represents the whole tag set and each leaf node indicates a specific tag. Hence,
although adversaries may not understand the encrypted messages, they still can conduct counting attack.
In order to defend against counting attack toward RFID system,we propose a novel security protocol ACSP (Anti-Counting
Security Protocol). ACSP is designed to secure the whole system via protecting twomain phases in RFID system: SELECTION
and LOCATION. Compared with existing security protocols, ACSP provides overall security of system besides individual
privacy. Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
• We define a new security threat toward UHF RFID system named counting attack, which might seriously threaten the
system security.
• We propose a security protocol ACSP which can effectively defend against this attack while providing regular security
features.
We evaluate the performance of ACSP through theoretical analysis and qualitative comparison. Results show that ACSP
can efficiently withstand counting attack while being able to defend against regular security threats as existing protocols.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes fundamentals of RFID system, cardinality estimation
approaches and counting attack. In Section 3, we propose a novel security protocol ACSP. Section 4 analyzes ACSP, and
Section 5 is the discussion of ACSP. We conclude this paper in Section 6.
2. UHF RFID system protocol and cardinality estimation approaches
Among many existing works, we take the prevalent EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 (C1G2) specification [16] as an
example to demonstrate UHF RFID system model and its security weakness.
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Fig. 2. EPCgobal C1G2 protocol.
The C1G2 physical layer protocol defines a series of physical options for both up-link and down-link. The communication
procedure is specified in the MAC layer section. In this paper, we mainly focus on MAC layer protocol of C1G2 specification.
The communication model is called Reader Talk First, in which a Framed Slotted Aloha [17] like protocol is used. To identify
a specific tag, the reader executes the following two phases, as shown in Fig. 2: (i) SELECTION, the reader sets the frame
size and sends a Select command containing mask bits indicating which tag should reply, as it does not know exactly which
tag is in its interrogation range now; (ii) LOCATION, the reader sends a Query/QueryRepeat/QueryAdjust command to start a
new slot. If the selected tag decides to reply in this slot, it responds with a 16-bits random number (RN16) upon receiving
the slot start command. The reader echoes an ACK if no collision happens, and then the tag replies its ID information (EPC)
for identification upon successfully receiving the ACK. Otherwise the reader starts another new slot or ends this frame. The
details of the whole procedure are elaborated in [16].
The frame size determined in SELECTION phase is a critical parameter to RFID system performance. On one side, short
frames lead to more reply collisions, and thus the reader will need more rounds to identify all tags. On the other side, long
frames might force the reader to spend more unnecessary time on no-reply slots. Schoute [18] showed that the optimum
occurs when the number of slots is equal to the number of tags.
Asmentioned above, frame size greatly affects system performance. ALOHA scheme is widely used to find a proper frame
size. Kodialam andNandagopal [19] provided a basic ALOHAmethod to do cardinality estimation. Suppose the exact number
of tag set is t , and the reader initializes the round with frame size f . Let ρ = t/f , and each tag decides which slot to respond
uniformly. Let N0,Nc represent the number of no-reply slots and collision slots, respectively, then the expectations of the
two values are:
E[N0] ≈ f e−ρ; (1)
E[Nc] ≈ f (1− (1+ ρ)e−ρ). (2)
With corresponding variations:
Var[N0] ≈ f e−ρ(1− (1+ ρ)e−ρ); (3)
Var[Nc] ≈ f e−ρ((1+ ρ)− (1+ 2ρ + ρ2 + ρ3)e−ρ). (4)
The reader can repeat the SELECTION phase several times to reduce the variation, and then solve the equations to
estimate the number of tags. Kodialam [20] proposed a solution to estimate the cardinality of multi-reader system and
dynamic change set based on this scheme. Qian [21] increased the accuracy of cardinality estimation in large-scale system
via collecting the bitmaps of replies in each reader. Moreover, they improved algorithm performance by supposing the tags’
reply follows geometric distribution. Han [22] suggested that algorithm performance can be further improved by analyzing
the first reply position in the frame.
Tree-based scheme is another approach aimed at directly identifying the whole tag set rapidly. In contrast, this is a
deterministic method. The reader probes tags like traversing a binary tree from the top down. The root represents the whole
set and each leaf node stands for one specific tag according to tag’s ID. Pan and Wu [23] proposed a tree-based algorithm
named Smart Trend-Traversal (STT). STT adopts query traversal path (QTP) to indicate the reader probing movement. STT
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defines three types of nodes in traversal tree: empty node, singleton node and collision node refer to no tags match, one tag
match and multiple tags match, respectively. Accordingly, three types of traversal movement are applied. (1) For collision
node, traverses down by using a longer prefix; (2) for singleton node, moves in the breath-first order to the immediate right
node whenever meets collision node; (3) for empty node, moves one level up if no response at right child, otherwise moves
horizontally to the right.
3. Security protocols
It is observed why RFID system is vulnerable to malicious access after analyzing system protocol.
• Low computation capacity. The no built-in battery structure of RFID tag makes it can only gain power from carrier
wave broadcasted by the reader, and this severely restricts the computation capacity of the system. Thus, it requires
an efficiency and energy-saving security protocol.
• Large-scale deployment. The system, especially tags, might be large-scale deployment. As a result, adversaries can
conduct spoofing attack and make it hard to be detected.
• Transmission signal is susceptible. RFID system depends completely on wireless communication, and wireless signal can
easily be eavesdropped, interfered or even modified.
• Operatingmode. Reader Talk Firstmodemakes tags passively listen to reader’s commands. As a consequence, it is difficult
for a tag to verify the reader’s legality.
Consequently, we summarize five requirements for an ideal security RFID system: (i) privacy: private information, such as
tags ID, user name, should not be leaked to any third party during authentication; (ii) untraceability: tags in the system should
not be correlated to its output authentication messages, it may be tracked by attackers otherwise; (iii) cloning resistance:
attackers cannot be able to use bogus tags to impersonate a valid tag; (iv) forward secrecy: attackers can compromise a
tag to obtain the keys stored in it. In this case, those keys should not reveal the previous outputs of the captured tag;
(v) compromising resistance: some protocols adopt methods like shared key to improve search efficiency. In this case, the
number of threatened tags should be minimized after a successful compromising of tags.
Representative security protocols are selected to be presented in this subsection. And performance analysis of these
protocols will be shown in later section. Note that nearly every protocol needs one or several hash functions to generate
crypt message. Here we assume these functions are denoted like f (x1, x2, . . . , xn), and each tag has its own serial number
TID.
(a) PRF private authentication protocol
PRF private authentication protocol [6] contains two challenge-response rounds and requires a secret key s for each
tag. (i) The reader first generates a nonce R1 and sends request message (HELLO, R1). Upon receiving the HELLO message,
tags respond (R2, δ = TID XOR fs(0, R1, R2)). (ii) The reader finds (s, TID) pair after successfully getting reply from a tag
in its database, satisfying TID = δ XOR fs(0, R1, R2) and then sends τ = TID XOR fs(1, R1, R2). The tag checks whether
TID = τ XOR fs(1, R1, R2) at last.
This protocol is easy to deploy. However, PRF private authentication protocol lacks TID update operations, andmaywaste
a great deal of time to find correct (s, TID) pair in large-scale system.
(b) Hash Chain
Hash Chain [8] protocol requires three hash functions:
• f (x), update TID
• g(x), encrypt reply message from tag
• h(x), encrypt acknowledge message sent by reader.
Backend entity (e.g. reader and correspondingdata) keeps two records of ID information for each tag to copewithmessage
loss. The whole procedure is shown in Fig. 3. However, in the opposite, we must prudently choose these three fixed hash
function if decide to adopt hash chain protocol in our system. As all three hash functions remain unchanged in following
communication.
(c) Security protocol with tree-based key management
In order to improve search efficiency, Dimitriou [11] use balanced tree structure to manage keys of each tag. Each key is
corresponding to the path from root to the leaf node assigned to the tag (Fig. 4). Note that if c represents branching factor
of the tree and n for the total number of tag, the search time will be reduced to (c − 1) logc n.
Let d represent the path length, and then each pair of (ID, 1), (ID, 2), . . . , (ID, d) can denote the secret values along the
path to tag with TID ID. Here Rr , Rt are two random numbers generated by reader and tag respectively, and R = Rr ‖ Rt .
Although this technique greatly improves the search efficiency on reader side, one tag shares several segments of its key
with others. As it is lack of update operation for the key tree and the tree is fixed after being created, the system with this
protocol will suffer critical damage once compromising attack happens.
(d) Strong and lightweight RFID private authentication protocol
The Strong and lightweight RFID Private Authentication (SPA) Protocol [12] enables key-updating for balanced tree base
authentication approaches via temporary keys and state bits. Temporary key stores the old key for each non-leaf node and
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Fig. 3. Hash Chain protocol.
Fig. 4. Tree-based key management with c = 2.
state bits record the key-updating status of nodes in the sub-trees. Each non-leaf node automatically perform key-updating
when all its children nodes have updated their keys. Key-updating operation is employed after a tag successfully performs
its identification with the reader. The procedure of SPA protocol is described as follows.
(i) The reader sends a request and a nonce R1.
(ii) Tags catch the request and reply U = (R2, h(kID1 , R1), . . . , h(kIDd , R1)), where d is the path length and kID1 , . . . , kIDd denote
the secret values along the path to this tag. R2 is a nonce sent by the tag.
(iii) The reader gets U and searches for the corresponding leaf node representing the tag. Corresponding non-leaf nodes
uses temporary key temp_kj to store the old key and updates their own key by k′j = h(kj)when all its state bits become
1.
(iv) The reader sends δ = h(kIDd , R1, R2) for authentication and a synchronization message including update information.
(v) The tag receives these messages and then verifies δ. If yes, the tag updates the key according to the synchronization
message.
In order to do counting attack, adversaries can just simply implement algorithms described above, either deterministic
or probabilistic schemes. Actually we can abstract both two algorithms perform as three steps: (i) the reader determines
which tags to probe and sets parameters such as frame size, and then sends commands (e.g. Select and then Query) to start.
(ii) The reader adjusts pertinent parameters, e.g. the frame size and the mask bits, according to the responses’ number and
distribution in last slot/frame and then queries the tags repeatedly. (iii) The reader makes estimation based on these replies
information at the end.
We notice that both two algorithms mainly work on SELECTION phase, and what they demand is that whether one
specific slot is a collision slot, a singleton slot or an empty one, instead of the detailed information contained in back-scatter
messages. The aforementioned challenge-response model and existing security protocols only secure LOCATION phase to
prevent the leak of ID information, and neglects the threat toward SELECTION phase. As a result, existing security protocols
based on this model cannot withstand counting attack.
4. Anti-counting security protocol
To defend against RFID counting attack, we propose Anti-Counting Security Protocol (ACSP). ACSP imports a session
identifier (SID) which is used for verifying the validity of reader and communication period. Tags will only respond to query
commands with correct SID and reader is required to periodically update SID to ensure freshness of SID. ACSP is composed
of SID Update and Tag Identification procedures.
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Fig. 5. SID update.
We first define some notations used in the protocol:
Rx Pseudo-random number x generated by reader or tags
CRC Cyclic redundancy check code of message
H(x1, x2) One-way hash function with variables x1, x2
SID Session identifier
TID Tag identifier
MASKVAL Bit mask contained in Select command used for selecting target tag
MSG_HEADER Header of message which indicates the type of the message, including:
• UPDSID, SID update command from reader to tag;
• SELECT , Select command;
• QUERY , Query command;
• IDENT , identification message from tag, containing TID information;
• AUTHEN , authentication message from reader;
• QUERYREP,QUERYADJUST , commands used for ending current slot.
And the message format is as follows:
MSG_HEADER Message content CRC
(a) SID update
This procedure periodically updates SID, which contains two steps. (i) The reader generates two random numbers R1 and
R2, and then sends SID update command to notify tags to update SID stored in their local memory. The format of update
command is (UPDSID, R1, R2,H(R1, SIDcur), CRC). Here SIDcur represents the identifier used in current communication
session. Due to the property of one-way hash function, SIDcur is hard to crack even though R1 and H(R1, SIDcur) are known.
As a result, given a specific R1 and SIDcur, a command that cannot provide the correct value of H(R1, SIDcur) is considered
invalid. (ii) Each tag checks the value of H(R1, SIDcur) and CRC to see whether the command is valid. If yes, they update local
SID as SIDnew = H(R1XOR R2, SIDcur), where SIDnew stands for the new SID used in the following communication session.
Note that SIDcur is no longer valid after updating. The whole procedure is shown in Fig. 5.
(b) Tag identification
Tag identification procedure provides secured communication and information exchange between the reader and tags.
It is also compatible with prevailing industrial system specifications, e.g. EPCglobal C1G2 and ISO 18000-6C.
The reader first determines the target tag by sending encrypted Select command (SELECT , R3,H(R3, SID), (MASKVAL XOR
SID), CRC), where R3 is a random number generated by the reader and SID is the current session identifier. In this command,
R3 and corresponding H(R3, SID) can be regarded as certification information. And the reader uses SID to conceal the real
value of MASKVAL. Thus, adversaries are unable to know which tag the reader is interrogating via eavesdropping without
correct SID. Then, upon receiving the Select command, the tag checks the included CRC, R3 and corresponding H(R3, SID). If
all are correct, the tag getsMASKVAL by calculating (MASKVAL XOR SID) XOR SID=MASKVAL. The tag gets ready to respond
if its own ID matches MASKVAL, otherwise keeps silent until receiving the next Select command.
After sending Select command, the reader generates a random number R4 and sends Query command (QUERY , R4,H(R4,
SID), CRC). The tags in ready state examine the CRC and correctness of (R4,H(R4, SID)) in the Query command af-
ter receiving it. If they are correct, the ready tags generate a random number R5 and respond to identification mes-
sages, (IDENT , R5,H(R4, TID), CRC) respectively. If the reader receives the identification message successfully without
collision, it will search for the tag’s exact TID in database according to R4 and H(R4, TID). Otherwise, the reader sends
(QUERYREP/QUERYADJUST , Rp,H(Rp, SID), CRC) to end this slot and start a new one if the frame size is not exceeded.
Once the reader finds the TID of the responding tag from database, updates tag’s TID as TIDnew = H(R4 XOR R5, TID).
Then the reader responds the authentication message, (AUTHEN,H(R5, TID), CRC), to inform the tag to update its TID
immediately. The tag receiving the authentication message checks H (R5, TID). If it is correct, its ID will be replaced with
H (R4 XOR R5, TID), otherwise it does nothing. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Tag identification.
5. Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of ACSP in this section. According to [24], systems working in wireless environment are
vulnerable to security threats, especially the RFID system whose computing capability is constrained. We first show that
ACSP is able to protect the privacy of RFID system against both passive and active attacks, e.g. sniffing (eavesdropping),
tracking, spoofing, replay attack, as well as counting attack. We then evaluate the overhead of ACSP.
Security analysis. We first assume that the communication between the reader and the database is secured. The adversary is
supposed to fully understand ACSP and has the equipments which can read communication messages and send exactly the
same signals as either the reader or tags in legal system.
Normally, passive attack in wireless environment refers to eavesdropping, which means attackers can know private
information simply via eavesdropping communication messages. For RFID system, tag ID is the critical information in the
system. In ACSP, this attack is prevented by encrypted TID using one-way hash function H(x1, x2) and a random number.
According to the preimage-resistance [25] property of one-way hash function, it is infeasible for attackers to find TID from
Rx and H(TID, Rx). Note that attackers may guess ID information by analyzing the MASKVAL in Select command before the
identification procedure and observing the replies from tags. However, this potential danger is generally ignored in the
existing literature. Thus, we require the reader to encrypt theMASKVAL by XORing with SID. The original value of MASKVAL
can only be revealed in case SID is known.
Active attacks toward RFID includes tracking, spoofing and replay attack. For tracking attack, ACSP utilizes TID update
and random number challenge to defend against illegitimate tracking. These operations ensure that the encrypted TID
information H(TID, R4) in reply messages will vary according to the change of the random number. Besides, if successful
authentication is made, the tag will update its TID consequently. Thus, attackers can hardly track the tag without seizing the
precise value of TID. For spoofing attack, in ACSP, each tag is required to reply identification message containing H(TID, R4),
where R4 is the random number given in Query/QueryRepeat command. This indicates the attacker could hardly generate
correct value of H(TID, R4) to deceive the reader without knowing TID. For replay attack, ACSP ask the reader to respond
according to the random number in identification message sent by the tag. The tag would not update its TID upon receiving
an incorrect authentication message. Moreover, we can make the reader and the tag generate random number differs from
the previous one. Each tag keeps copies of the random numbers contained in last received valid SID update command and
Query/QueryRepeat command. If the tag receives the same random number as the last one, it is consider that this command
is sent by an attacker.
The most important concern of ACSP is how to prevent the system from counting attack. As mentioned above, attackers
do not care about specific tag IDs and their corresponding objects. Nevertheless, common security protocols secure only the
identification and authentication messages to protect the privacy of a specific tag and may fail to handle such attack. ACSP
provides a simple but efficient way to eliminate the counting threat. If the reader could not give the correct Rx,H(Rx, SID)
pair, tags will simply ignore the command and keep silent until it receives the right one. In addition, MASKVAL is encrypted
by XORing with SID to block the attacker from perceiving target tags to estimate the number of tags by observing the replies
from tags. An adversary needs to know the SID to forge commands to make tags respond as this will. This situation can
hardly occur as the reader periodically updates the SID to protect the attacker from guessing SID by brute-force trials.
Overhead. To implement ACSP, both reader and tags have to consume an extramemory space to store SID. Besides, a pseudo-
randomnumber generator and hash function logic circuits are required to equip. Fortunately, the state-of-the-art electronics
industry provides feasible solutions for RFID system, especially at the tag side, to realize logic functions, e.g. Linear Feedback
Shift Register (LFSR) as randomnumber generator [9], AES-like algorithm to achieve the effect of one-way hash function [26]
etc. We assume each time either the reader or the tag executes XOR/hashing/random number generates operation cost
CXOR, CH , CR units of resource respectively. Let n stands for the total number of tag ID stored in backend database. Thus, the
overhead of a successful SID update and tag identification procedure in ACSP is illustrated in Table 1.
We compare ACSP with several representative existing security protocols already described in Section 2. Note that
computation cost of ACSP includes two procedures aswell as Select command, which is rarelymentioned in previous related
works. It can be observed from Table 1 that our ACSP has the ability to handle counting attack with acceptable additional
system cost.
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Table 1
The performance comparison of ACSP and other protocols.
ACSP PRF [6] Hash Chain [8] Binary tree
identification [11]
SPA [12]a
Computation
overhead (Tag)
3CXOR + 7CH + 1CRb 2CXOR + 2CH + 1CR 2CH 1CXOR+ log2 nCH+1CR (log2 n+1)CH+1CR
Computation
overhead (reader)c
3CXOR + 6CH + 4CR 1CXOR + 1CH + 1CR 3CH 1CXOR + 1CR 1CH + 1CR
Search overhead O(n) O(n) O(n) O(log2 n) O(log2 n)
Eavesdropping Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tracking Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Spoofing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Replay attack Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Counting attack Yes No No No No
Features Provide system scale
security as well as
individual scale
Easy to deploy. No
update operation
Only require three hash
function to implement
the protocol
Low search overhead
in identifying the tag.
No update operation
Low search
overhead with
update operation
a Update overhead is not included in the table. Actually the computation consumption of one complete ID update procedure is log2 n ∗ CH at both sides.
b CXOR, CH , CR means the cost of one execution of XOR/hashing/random number generates operation, respectively.
c Search computation overhead is shown in Row ‘‘Search Overhead’’.
Fig. 7. Modified SID update.
6. Discussion
Wemake two assumptions when designing ACSP. In this section, we discuss how these assumptions may affect ACSP.
(a) No message lost in communication
We assume that no message will be lost in the whole communication procedure. Actually, in real system, signal
turbulence and attenuation occurs frequently. In ACSP, message lost may result in de-synchronization between the reader
and tags. Because if SID/TID update command are lost, only the reader updates SID/TID while tags do not. As a result, the
legal reader cannot communicate with tags in following communication because SIDs/TIDs are no longer matched. To solve
this problem, we slightly modify our ACSP as follows.
Inmodified SID update procedure, as showed in Fig. 7, the reader is required to set a retransmit limit and repeatedly send
update command, as described in Section 4, until no tag responds or the retransmit times reach the limit. Each tag should
respond to an ACK message, (UPDACK , R2, CRC), upon receiving the valid update command and updates SID stored in its
local memory. Note that after the tag updates the TID, it will not reply an ACKmessage upon receiving the update command
which contains the old TID. Here the retransmit limit is mandatory due to the concern of Denial of Attack (DoS), in which
adversaries continuously send ACK messages to confuse the reader that there are still tags which have not updated the SID
yet.
To solve the message lost problem occurring in the tag identification procedure, we let the reader preserve a copy of TID
used in the last successful identification for each tag. If authentication message is lost in this round and the tag does not
update its own TID consequently, the reader can search for the last successful identification TID. This technique has been
already implemented in several related work such as [7,8].
(b) Immune to physical attack
Authors in [12,13,27] discussed the physical attack, inwhich attackersmight probably steal the tag’s ID and other security
information via physically compromising the tag and reading thememory. In ACSP, SIDwill be revealed if the attackersmake
physical attack to any tags in the system since all tags store the same SID. As a consequence, ACSP will fail to action. Even
worse, the attacker can update the SID one step ahead than the legal reader.
However, we do not consider physical attack during designing ACSP, because we believe that attackers may also lack
equipments which can directly read tag’s memory. Furthermore, we can apply access password to RFID tags so that if illegal
access happens, the tag will automatically self-destroy. We will discuss protocol design concerned to physical attack in
future work.
7. Conclusion
Current research works on RFID system mainly focus on the methods to protect communication security, especially
the privacy of ID information, between one single tag and one specific reader. Unfortunately, most existing protocols are
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vulnerable to counting attack, which happens frequently in lots of applications. In this paper, we first formally defined
counting attack. Then, we proposed ACSP, which is compatible with industrial system specifications and is able to handle
counting attack efficiently as well as other common security threats. We evaluated the performance of ACSP through
theoretical analysis and qualitative comparison. Results show that ACSP can efficiently withstand counting attack while
being able to defend against regular security threats as existing protocols.
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